NEPOTISM: ON BEING ONE'S BROTHER'S KEEPER

THE

NEWLY AMENDED Utah anti-nepotism statute, which categorically forbids a public official to hire or retain in public employment his
brother or other specified relatives,1 was recently attacked in Backman
v. Bateman.2 There, two school teachers, who had been employed for
many years prior to the election of their brothers to their respective
local school boards, were notified that the statute prohibited renewal
of their teaching contracts for the coming year 3 They brought an original action for a declaratory judgment 4 in the Supreme Court of Utah,
claiming that this constituted a deprivation of the property rights that
they had in their employment without due process of law.' The court
agreed that such application of the statute would be unconstitutional, 6
reasoning that the state, in the exercise of its police power, could validly
limit a right to employment only where there inhered an evil of "substantial nature."' 7 Chief Justice Wolfe, concurring, contended that
the state's police power was not so limited, and that the condition
precedent to state employment imposed by the statute was not so unreasonable as to be invalid. But he observed that the instant application
of the statute was unconstitutional in that it deprived the petitioners of8
property rights in local retirement funds without due process of law.
.UTAH CODE ANN. §

52-3-I

0953 Supp.): "It is unlawful for any person holding

any position the compensation for which is paid out of public funds to retain in employment or to employ, appoint, or vote for the appointment of, his or her father,
mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first
cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law in or to any position or employment, when the salary, wages, pay or compensation of such appointee is to be paid out of any public funds; and it is unlawful for
such appointee to accept or retain such employment in all cases where the direct power
of employment or appointment to such position is or can be exercised by any person
within the degrees of consanguinity or affinity herein specified, or by a board or group
of which such person is a member."
2 i Utah zd 153 , 263 P.zd 561 (x953).
Prior to itsamendment, the statute had had no effect where the hiring power was
vested in a board and the board member related to the applicant had abstained from
voting. UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-3-I (1953). See Backman v. Bateman, x UTAH 2d 153,
154, 263 P.2d 561 (1953).
' See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-33-2 (1953).
i Utah 2d 153, i56, 263 P.2d 561, 56z (-953).
"Id. at 157, 263 P.2d at 563. The court also alluded to UTAH CONST. ART, XII,
§ :"Every person in this State shall be free to obtain employment whenever possible."
i Utah 2d 153, 157, 263 P.2d at 563 (1953).
8 Id. at 16o, 263 P.zd at 565. Each of the teachers had contributed to local teachers'
retirement funds which contained provisions allowing a teacher leaving the local system
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Two justices dissented, being unpersuaded that even these latter rights
were such as to merit constitutional protection.9
Since the Middle Ages, the favoring of relatives with public or
quasi-public positions has been recognized as an undesirable practice.'0
At least eighteen American states," in their attempts to control the practice, have enacted constitutional' 2 or statutory provisions directly forbidding it, either in general terms covering all public positions,'1 with
or without specific exemptions, 4 or by enumerating specific offices. 5 In
1955]

to make double contributions and continue membership, but had no provisions allowing
for withdrawal of previous contributions under the circumstances of the principal case.
Since the decision in the Backman case, the Utah legislature has abolished all teachers'
local retirement funds; contributions are now made to a state fund. Utah Laws 1st
Spec. Sess. 1953, c. 7,.
Subsequent to this enactment, rehearing was denied. in the
Backman case.
0 i Utah 2d 153, 168-71, 263 P.zd at 570-73 (1953).

"0See
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"Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Utah. In at least four other states, a husband-wife relationship has been
held to be a disqualifying interest under a statute which forbids a public officer to have
an interest, either direct or indirect, in a public contract. See, e.g., Woodward v.
City of Wakefield, z36 Mich. 417, 21io N.W. 322 (1926); Harrison v. City of
Elizabeth, 70 N.J.L. 591, 57 At1. 132 (i9o4) 5 Sturrv. Borough of Elmer, 75 N.J.L.
443, 67 Atl. 1059 (1907); Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. i, 6o A.2d 774
(x948); cf. Haislip v. White, 124 W.Va. 633, zz S.E.ad 361 (1942). See generally
Note, 74 A.L.R. 792 (193).
'2See, e.g., ARK. CONST. AMEND. XXXV, § 85 Mo. CONST. ART. 7, § 6; UTAH
CONST. ART. VIII, § 15.
' 3 E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 8i-ios (1943): "No appointee in any of the departments
shall be relatives of any of the heads of departments created by Section 81-ioi." See
also IDAHO CODE § 59-701 (947); MONT. REV. CODE §§ 59-518, 59-519, 59-920
(19.7) ; S.C. CODE § 50-101 (1952).
14 E.g., ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 54-416 (1939)

(exempts school teachers if the school
board unanimously votes to accept) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 116.xo (194)
(exempts those
who employ only one person within the prohibited degree of relationship) ; IowA CODE
ANN. § 71.1 (1949) (exempts principal if supervisor who approves his bond also approves his appointment, or if appointee is either a school teacher or earns less than
$6oo a year) ; MIss. CODE ANN. § 4051 (1942) (exempts relative who was in subordinate position when "his or her kinsman" became head) ; TEX. PEN. CODE arts. 43 1,
438 (Vernon 1952) (exempts appointee who has held job two or more years prior
to the placement of relative, notaries public, and assistants of legislators who need help
as a result of physical infirmities); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-110
(1941)
(exempts
teachers and also employees who make less than $6oo a year).
llE.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. (1947) § z1-649 (tax collectors in levee districts), § 392o
(jury commissioners), § 47-116 (fish and game commissioner), § 72-1216 (massage
board of examiners), §§ 8o-i18, 80-217, 80-219, 8o-og, 80-510, 80-511, 80-2509,
80-2531, 80-2819, 80-2520, 80-3115 (widely varying phases of public education),
§ 83-120 (public welfare department); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (i94.9) § 13-2903
(first-class cities), § 14-537 (second-class cities), § 20-901 (district court reporters),
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most of these cases these provisions, standing alone, do not contemplate
the effect of the prohibition. 6 Yet, some courts have held that where
the appointee's qualifications have been objectively established, the antinepotism provisions do not apply, since they are aimed only at the
elimination of inefficiency. 17 Other courts, however, have taken judicial notice of the "evil inherent" in the practice itself and have enforced the prohibition without regard to the appointee's qualifications.' 8
The conflict exhibited by the opinions in the Backman case illustrates
this divergence of judicial attitudes as to the effect of anti-nepotism provisions rather than a divergence as to whether or not a state may properly control the practice. Courts have consistently upheld the right of
a state to prohibit the appointment of relatives to public office on broad
policy grounds, accepting almost without question the standards imposed
by the legislature.' 9 And although in giving advisory opinions, several
§ 28-7o6 (county jail matrons), §§ 72-1347, 72-1348 (school teachers), § 74-2411
(state commissioner of internal revenue), § 74-605 (state corporation commissioner),
§ 76-ioi (state institutions), § 76-1504 (state sanatorium). In Kansas, relationship
within the ninth degree has been held sufficient to disqualify. Bailey v. Turner, xo8
Kan. 856, 197 Pac. 214 (1921).
16See, e.g., N.D. REV. CODE § 44-0409

(1943): "No head of any executive or
administrative department, either elective or appointive, of this state, shill appoint
his wife or her husband, as the case may be, son, daughter, brother or sister, to any
position under the control or direction of said head of such department."
'E.g., State ex rel. Robinson v. Keefe, iii Fla. 701, 149 So. 638 (1933). Cf.
State ex rel. Pittman v. Barker, 113 Fla. 695, i52 So. 682 (934); MONT. REV. CODE
§ 59-518 (947): "Nepotism is the bestowal of political patronage by reason of relationship rather than of merit."
1 See, e.g., Reddell v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 199, 170 Pac. 273 (1918); Barton v.
Alexander, 27 Idaho 286, 148 Pac. 471 (1915). The charge of hiring relatives has
even been held libelous per se, though no statute prohibited it. Parmerlee v. Nottage,
119 Minn. 351, 138 N.W. 312 (i912)5 cf. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Wegner,
182 S.W. 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). And one commentator has observed that it is
no more valid to say that hiring relatives for public office should be condoned if the
appointee is qualified than it is to say that the buying of public offices is not to be
condemned if the purchaser is well fit for the position. 64 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 257
(1900).

Penalties for violation of anti-nepotism statutes range from fine and imprisonment
to forfeiture of compensation. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 2923 (1942) (penalty of not
less than $z5 nor more than $5oo, up to six months imprisonment or both); MONT.
REV. CODE § 59-920 (1947) ($5o to $iooo, six months imprisonment, or both) ; N.D
REV. CODE § 44-0410 (19+3) (salary of appointor assessed to regain money paid out);
OHIO REV. CODE § 3319.21 (Page 1954) (contract in violation void); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 7-.2 (1949) (bondsman and principal liable for moneys paid out). See State
ex rel. Robinson v. Keefe, iii Fla. 701, 149 So. 638 (1933) for an opinion that
such statutes, being penal, must be strictly construed.
29
E.g., Reddell v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 199, 202, 170 Pac. 273, 274 (1918). See
Barton v. Alexander, 27 Idaho 286, 297, 148 Pac. 471, 475 (1915), where the

.955]
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state courts have held that proposed anti-nepotism statutes would violate the Federal Constitution, 20 it seems unlikely that the United States
Supreme Court would so hold if it were confronted with this question.
In Atkin v. Kansas,2i the Court held that the state could prescribe the
conditions upon which it would permit public work to be done. And in
Kotch v.Board of River PortPilot Commissioners,2 2 it upheld a statute
which, in effect, required that an applicant be related to a member of
the appointing board as a condition precedent to his employment, noting
that a state has the right to select its own employees in its own way
so long as it is not arbitrary. The most compelling policy underlying anti-nepotism provisions
would appear to be the minimization of governmental inefficiency.24
Accordingly, where a separate law requires a specific competence as a
prerequisite for appointment to a specific position, this end would seem
to have been served, and anti-nepotism provisions would seem, in spirit,
to be inapplicable.2 5 Where, however, the court feels that this construction is foreclosed by the liberal language of the anti-nepotism pro:vision itself,2 6 there would seem to be no constitutional bar to its uncourt said, "We believe it to be within the legislative power to prohibit officers from
appointing persons related to them by affinity or consanguinity, in the interest of efficiency in public service and for the best interests of the people and of the municipal subdivisions of the state, and as a legitimate police regulation, in regard to which the
law-making power may legislate, and reasonable regulation in regard thereto is constitutional and enforceable. Nepotism .. . ought to be eradicated . .. and we know of
nothing . . . that prohibits . . . passing reasonable regulations in regard thereto."
20E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, z2 N.E.zd 49 (1939); Opinion to
the House of Representatives, 96 A.zd 623 (R.I. i953). But. cf. Wayne County v.
Steele, 1zi Neb. 438, 237 N.W. 288 (-931).
21 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
22 330 U.S. 552 (1947).

"I1d.at 557. See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344. U.s. 183 (1952) i Adler v. Board
of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Gerende v. Board of Superiors, 34I U.S. 56
(950i) Garner v. Board of Public Works, 342 U.S. 716 (i95i). Although a retroactively operative statute might be attacked as "arbitrary" or "unreasonable," the Court,
significantly, has never invalidated a statute on that ground alone. Cf. cases cited in note
27 infra. The Court has also held that a government employee has no property right
in a public position. Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74- (937)5 Taylor v.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (9oo) ; Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (189o). Cf.
McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (89z).
2 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
2 See note 29 and accompanying text supra. This conclusion would also seem to
have been codified, in substance, in those states whose statutes provide that the antinepotism provisions shall not apply where the appointee has held his office a certain
length of time before his relative-appointor takes his position. E.g., TEx. PEN. CODE
art. 432 (Vernon 1952) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 4o52 (942).
See also Opinion to the
House of Representatives, 96 A.zd 623, 625 (R.I. 2953).
2'The courts seem to assume that the statutes apply without regard to the applicant's
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restricted application, provided that the standard employed is definite
and not arbitrary. 7 Thus, the court in the Backman case, in construing
an anti-nepotism provision of this latter type as it did, appears to have
substituted its judgment for that of the legislature and, to this extent,
would appear to have exceeded the limits of judicial propriety.
PAUL

V. EVANS

qualifications. See, e.g., Barton v. Alexander, 27 Idaho z86, 148 Pac. 471 (915), note
i9 supra. But cf. State ex. rel. Robinson v. Keefe, xi Fla. 701, 149 So. 638 (1933).
27 See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra; cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
277 (U.S.

1867)5 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1867). In both of these
cases the Supreme Court invalidated acts which expressly disqualified certain named
persons from holding public office as being in the nature of a bill of attainder.
The weakness of such acts was said to lie in the fact that they disqualified a person
or class of persons for reasons which were not disqualifying factors at the time the
jobs were given and which did not test the person's ability.

